



The Solari Report

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**A Unipolar vs. Multipolar World
with The Saker**





A Unipolar vs. Multipolar World

C. Austin Fitts: Ladies and gentlemen, it's my pleasure to welcome back to The Solari Report the Saker. We're so excited. He's agreed to come quarterly for the year, and we're going to talk each time about the shift from the unipolar to multipolar world. I can't tell you how excited I am that we're doing this.

Our first conversation several months ago was a huge success. So Saker, welcome back to The Solari Report.

Saker: Thank you very, very much. It's a real pleasure.

C. Austin Fitts: After we did our last interview, one of our most astute subscribers came and said, "I have to confess I really don't understand what it means to go from a unipolar to a multipolar world." He said, "It makes sense that that is true, so I believe it's true, but I'm so stuck in a unipolar world that I don't even understand what it means. Could you get Saker to go back and maybe explain this from scratch? Can we get a 101 course on unipolar to multipolar world?"

Saker: That sounds very good. I guess the first thing that comes to mind for me is the word "compromise," which directly entails the importance of diplomacy. I think that's the most important part of the change.

In a unipolar world, you have one entity setting the rules and enforcing them. So that's what we see today. For instance, think of the US State Department, which really should be called something like the "US Department of Orders and Ultimatums" or something like that. There is really no diplomacy taking place.

I mean, the empire says, "This is how it shall be," and then you either accept it and you get the protection of the empire, or you don't. In that case you are labeled a rogue state, a supporter of terrorism, or a supporter of dictatorship at the very least. I think a very clear manifestation of the difference is a



contrast between Russian and US diplomacy.

We have seen Russian diplomacy at work in the Ukraine and in Syria specifically. The other day I was listening to Professor Stephen Cohen, whom I consider the foremost authority on Soviet and Russian affairs in the United States. He mentioned something very interesting. He said that during both campaigns in the Ukraine, Putin clearly ordered a stop to the hostilities in a situation where the rebels could clearly maximize and go much further. In particular, take the city of Mariupol, which was very much in their hands. Then the same thing happened in Syria, where the Russians essentially offered negotiations at a moment when they were at the brink of reaching the Syrian border, completely liberating Aleppo.

If you think in terms of unipolar world, that makes no sense. I mean, there you are at the edge of a military victory, and suddenly you're stopping? That makes absolutely no sense.

In a multipolar world, the logic is very different. You stop there because you have created the conditions for compromise and negotiations.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: The reason why negotiations are preferable is that you would think, "Why should I negotiate when I could have it all?" It's better to negotiate because to have it all, I need a purely military solution that is temporarily very pleasant and rewarding, but it's not stable in the long term, whereas a negotiated solution is much more stable and much more long-term.

One of the characteristics of that diplomacy would be that negotiations and the role of diplomacy become number one. In a unipolar world, diplomacy is done mainly by aircraft carriers, and diplomats have a supportive role; they're on hand to deliver messages and to negotiate surrenders. In a multipolar world, their function is crucial and the supportive role is played by the military.

When the conditions are not right for a negotiation, then the military is used, but only to the point and up to the moment when the right conditions are created again. Then the diplomats take center stage, and we saw that with



Minsk-1, which was the result of the first Ukrainian defeat, Minsk-2, which was the result of the second Ukrainian defeat, and now the negotiations in Syria, which are the result of the defeat of Daesh in Syria. In all three cases, in purely military terms, the Russians could have easily pushed forward, but they did not do that. I think that is one of the most compelling differences between how a multipolar versus a unipolar world would function.

The second thing is in a unipolar world you don't have allies; you have hegemon and vassal states that agree and support and cheer the decisions of the emperor. Again, the way of functioning of the multipolar world (I don't know if you're aware of it), is that of President Rouhani of Iran, who clearly stated in a recent interview that, "Russia and I have different views on Syria and different objectives."

The second thing is in a unipolar world you don't have allies; you have hegemon and vassal states

It was very interesting because these two are fundamental allies, but both sides recognize that they have different priorities. Again, the output of their collaboration will be a compromise between what each party wants, but the compromise in no way weakens the resolve of what I call the formal resistance alliance, which is Russia-Iran-Syria-Hezbollah. The fact that all of them have differing views in no way weakens their effectiveness. They negotiate until they come to an agreement, and then they act towards a common objective. Yet they keep their completely separate sovereignty and their own opinion. I can give multiple examples of that separation.

C. Austin Fitts: Right. It's very interesting. Whenever I work with someone from Europe – and I'll hone in on the Swiss or the Dutch – both of which are very small countries. The citizens generally speak more than one language, so they're used to dealing with multiple languages. They pride themselves on understanding and dealing effectively with many different cultures. They are very outward looking in terms of taking responsibility to understand different areas of the world and to understand different people.

I used to live in Hong Kong, and I far preferred living there because in Hong Kong you would wake up, and the news was about every place in the world. In the United States, you wake up and the news is about the United States, and a



tiny amount about the rest of the world.

So they were much more knowledgeable and sophisticated about the world, whereas someone coming out of a unipolar world is really sheltered in a little unipolar bubble. It's funny when you go to a website to buy a product, and you have to click on what country you're from, and it's a website that sells globally. Now if you're from the United States, you have to move the cursor all the way down to the United States. Ten years ago it would automatically pop up the United States.

Saker: I noticed that. But in all fairness, the United States is isolated by two huge oceans, and the Internet being a US invention. I mean, I think the list of countries 10 years ago that would have been in the list under the United States would have been pretty short, whereas now they have internet in Nepal, and they have it in the most remote parts of South America and Africa.

C. Austin Fitts: And part of it is we're a small part of the market now. I'm not saying we're tiny, but if you look at the growth that's been happening around the world and in Asia, we are no longer the number one user of the internet at all.

Saker: I didn't know that.

C. Austin Fitts: Oh, yes. There's a great piece in *The Economist* called "The Great Race" about all the firms running to get internet into India because right now China is the largest internet market, but India is expected to go beyond China. It's very interesting. So, the gold rush is on, over in New Delhi.

Another thing about the multipolar world that is if you have the United States playing the cop, particularly with respect to the sea lanes, or with different transportation and trade issues, when you go to a multipolar world, then you run the risk of having to negotiate with multiple toll booths.

In a unipolar world, if you want to operate globally you just have to negotiate basically with one guy. In a multipolar world, you have to negotiate with many.

Saker: Yes, but I will also say about keeping the sea lines of communication



open, were they ever threatened? I mean, right now the United States is seriously saying that China is threatening the sea lines of communications that China completely depends on. So in reality, I think it's the "keeping open" concept is a fallacy. The only purpose really is to be able to close the sea lines if and when they want, and also to project power. I mean, the sea line of communication protection is a complete scam; I don't buy it for one second. I don't recall anybody ever trying to close it.

C. Austin Fitts: Here's where I buy it. If you're running a US company and you're in a unipolar world, I always illustrate by telling the story of when I was at Dillon Read. The chairman used to walk into the strategic planning meeting at the beginning of the year and say, "Let me tell you what's going to happen this year."

As long as you played ball, you had the intelligence, and you were given heads up and you had certainty. Now in a multipolar world, what we're seeing is US companies and investors getting surprised again and again. They own commodities that plummet and keep plummeting, and the companies don't know how, so they're surprised.

So you're not anymore operating in this information bubble where you're taken care of. You're in a much more complex, volatile, dynamic environment. So I think for a company that used to operate under the unipolar umbrella, you're now in a very different operating world and you're scared because your whole organization has to learn how to rock and roll, and it was not set up or evolved that way.

Saker: I understand that, but I would think of that more as intelligence support than keeping the sea lines of communication open. I mean, what I was referring to was the job of the US Navy to keep those lines open, and I don't recall the sea lines ever being threatened.

I mean piracy off the coast of Somalia was internationally organized and tolerated, and the Iranians did not close the Strait of Hormuz. If they had wanted to, they actually could have.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.



Saker: Again, I don't recall in Far East Asia, besides minor piracy issues, do not recall any country such as China or any other local country threatening to close the sea lines of communication.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: I wonder that the latest historical threat could be World War II and the US cutting off Japan from oil supplies. I mean, that would be the only one I could think of.

C. Austin Fitts: I constantly get asked what's going on in Syria, and I consistently answer, "I have no idea."

It has literally, from my vantage point, become impossible to discern what's really happening. So what is happening in Syria?

Saker: First of all, I would preface this by saying it's still extremely unstable. Basically the Russians have achieved their objectives, which were always clearly announced, and were always limited. Keep in mind that this fact is absolutely crucial, because it's always overlooked. The Russian force in Syria was always very small.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: You can think of it as 50 aircraft basically. Saudi Arabia and Turkey combined would be able to muster roughly 500 combat aircraft. So think of it as a ten- to-one ratio.

The Russian objectives were extremely limited. The first objective was to stabilize the Syrian government, basically to protect it from being overrun, and to protect Damascus from being taken over by Daesh. That objective has been achieved.

The second objective of the Russians was to create the conditions for negotiations. Again, they have achieved that objective.

So it's a very limited objective. There never was a plan to protect Syria from



NATO. Never. There never was a plan to protect Syria from Turkey. Never. Protect Hezbollah from Israel – that was never part of the plan. To win singlehandedly the war – all these people were predicting a huge intervention, and none of that ever became a reality.

The Russians used a very limited contingent, they used them extremely effectively, and they achieved superb results because what they did basically went through three phases. First, they basically destroyed the infrastructure on an operational level supporting Daesh. Then they wanted to close air support and to begin providing fire power to the Syrians because they lacked that very much. The Syrians have been at war against Daesh longer now than the Russians had been involved in World War II. This has been a long war.

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So their weapon were worn, their forces were decimated, and they had lost many people, so the Russians – while providing fire power in a close air support mission – at the same time were frantically busy rearming, training, and supporting the Syrian military until it became capable of offensive combat operations, which it has. At that moment in time, Putin essentially stopped it all, as he actually said he would, and basically created the conditions for negotiations.

One of the things, which is said but is not really important, is the Russians were saying that there is no such thing as a Free Syrian Army. They were saying that essentially they're sitting in Istanbul and London, but they don't exist on the ground in Syria. Now they're actually saying, "We're negotiating with the Free Syrian Army." So what's happening here?

Well, it's very simple. The Russians have extensive experience with that phenomenon in Afghanistan. What is known today as the Free Syrian Army is mostly composed of small groups that changed sides. They're former allies of Daesh who have now rebranded themselves from bad terrorists to good freedom fighters, in order not to be bombed and destroyed, and in order to be part of the political solution.



So what the Russians really did is they gave an incentive to a whole lot of Syrians who were opposed to the central government to break away from the real crazy, liver-eating crazies of Daesh and to join a political dialogue by rebranding themselves.

C. Austin Fitts: Explain who Daesh is.

Saker: Daesh is basically the same as ISIS, if you want to consider all that. I call them all Daesh on principle because there are thin, minor differences between Al Qaida, Daesh Al Islam, etc. Really we're talking about hardcore Wahhabi terrorists who absolutely hate pretty much everybody who does not agree with their brand of Islam. So they're viciously anti-Shia, of course, but they're also anti-Sunni if the Sunnis do not believe like they do. They're anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, and anti-everybody. Their plan is to create a state, the caliphate, that would live according to the religious edicts of ancient Saudi Arabia.

The other guys who decapitate online, slit throats, burn people alive, and all the horrors that you saw are all basically one confederation of Wahhabi crazies.

C. Austin Fitts: What's the difference between them and just a version of mercenaries?

Saker: Mercenaries in my book act primarily for money. There I think is a mix. These extremist groups – in Afghanistan were linked to drug deals. In the drug deals they were also very heavily involved in legal petroleum exports. Of course, there's a strong mobster element because there's nothing as good for a mobster thug than to rebrand himself as a combatant for the pure faith.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: But still their core ideology and their appeal to people, and the reason why people go and blow themselves up, which a mercenary is not going to do, is a sincere – if not frightening – belief in an extraordinarily simplified and distorted version of Islam.

C. Austin Fitts: Right. So now that Putin is saying that the Russians have



accomplished what they set out to do and they're leaving. Where will that leave things?

Saker: First of all, they're not leaving. They are kind-of, sort-of leaving. They've withdrawn most of their close air support and strike aircraft, but not all, specifically the SU-25, SU-24s, and some part of the SU-34s, which was the brand new aircraft. But they have left the air defense structure. That is unaffected. The S-400s are still there. The closer range Pantsir-Systems are still there. The Russian Navy is still in the Port of Tartus.

I think officially eight interceptors are there – four Sukhoi-30SM and four SU-35s still left over – but I think this group is going to be reinforced. So basically they have left an infrastructure needed to control airspace over Syria, prevent an attack on the Russians, and prevent the West from establishing a no-fly zone. And still, very much can come back. Literally, for instance, the more advanced aircraft that they have – the SU-34, could conduct strikes from Southern Russia, as could their strategic bombers, as could their submarines.

The big difference is that they are not providing what is called “close air support” just now, whereby you help a Syrian unit fighting for a specific town. They would come in and bomb right in front of them. That's what would be called close air support. They stopped doing that basically because of the negotiation. They radically reduced the number of sorties anyway, so they are saying, “Let's do it just for goodwill and withdraw a visible part of our contingent there.” But the special forces are still there and the airport is still functioning.

For them it's literally the flight time needed to get there. Putin officially said that. He said, “We can be back in a matter of hours.”

C. Austin Fitts: What it looks like to me is the United States had taken the position that they wanted Assad gone, and the Russians have prevented that, and the United States has stood down. Is that a fair interpretation?

Saker: Yes. Now the United States has stood down. I don't think that the forces inside the United States which were lobbying for a removal of Assad, the Neocons, Israel lobby and the Saudi lobby, are going to accept his survival in



office. I don't believe that Americans are going to play an honest role in this. I think they'll try to subvert it.

The Turks are in a very serious situation, and there still is a risk of a Turkish and Saudi invasion. I would not, by the way, remove some of the Russian aircraft from the Hmeimim air base, which is very close to Turkey and would make military sense. That could be read as a preparation for a possible Turkish move in, and then the Russians would be better off striking from a longer distance. It is also a way of making it harder for the Turks to invade because right now--since the buzzwords are peace and negotiations, it would make the Turks look terrible if they invaded Syria now. I think these were all considerations that I would call redeployment change of strategy.

Right now there are hopes that if the United States is willing to not disrupt and not push towards resumption of full-scale hostility, and that it might seek some kind of negotiated solution, which would basically unite them. The assumption was made that first you have to defeat Daesh, and then you fix and reform Syria. I think the ideal is the reverse. First you should fix Syria, because there's no doubt that the Saudi regime is unpopular, and Syria needs reform. Even the Russians said that from day one.

I think that they're trying to do that now. I think they're trying to get a negotiation going where most of the forces in Syria would participate in some kind of joint government of national salvation of some kind that unites against Daesh and then frees their country. I think that is the plan. Will it work? I think it is way too early to call it. I think it is a very daring plan to try to achieve peace first, and then solve the military problem – which is very hard to solve anyways. The Turks are going nowhere, and the Saudis are going nowhere, and these are the prime sponsors of this entire civil war. It's going to take a long while, even if they're successful.

C. Austin Fitts: Let's step back to the Saudis in Israel and go back to the Iran deal. Why did we reach an agreement with Iran? We see the tremendous controversy here about whether or not this deal made sense. So why did we make the deal? What do you think?

Saker: I have to admit here that I have always been fearing this, and I always thought that there would be a US attack on Iran. Therefore, I was surprised by



that deal. I have to confess that.

What I will say is that this was never about nuclear weapons. I don't think Iran had much of a nuclear weapon program. Iran might have had some research, but Iranians never tried to develop anything. I think they really don't need it, and I think they know that. I do take their leader seriously who says that this is an un-Islamic and a banned kind of warfare.

I think it's all about submitting Iran and not letting Iran get away with "murder" – "murder" being defined as openly defying the United States and Israel. That's one definition of political murder. The second one is you cannot allow Iran to be a successful and prosperous country, and Iran's having a peaceful nuclear program is one of the markers that says, "We're a developed country."

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The image that that empire wants of Muslim countries is backwardness. It's head-chopping, torturing, and basically totally barbarian. Here you have a country that has a large young population. The young are well educated, and they have managed to develop in spite of sanctions. It has an extremely sophisticated foreign policy, very advanced elites, and that country is not allowed to succeed because its success is a weakening of the empire. I think that was the real stake in Iran.

Now why was an agreement reached? My only explanation is imperial overreach. Literally the call was made, "We don't have what it takes to pursue this. We have to try to achieve by negotiations what we couldn't achieve by bullying because Iran is too influential, too powerful, and we need to talk to these guys and try to find some kind of *modus vivendi* with such a huge regional power." I think that explains the matter.

C. Austin Fitts: That's what I thought, too. I just interviewed Don Coxe, who is an investment advisor. He was insistent that this possible tolerance means that Iran is going to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short order of a couple of years, and the Saudis and Israel oppose that achievement because



what they realize is that you're going to have a nuclear race going on in the Middle East.

It really comes down to what the assessment of their ability to build a nuclear weapon.

Saker: I don't buy that argument, and I'll tell you why. I don't believe nuclear weapons play that kind of role at all. I mean, a nuclear weapon can be useful for a small country fearing invasion, but Iran is a big country that is uninvadable. The proof that Iran is strong enough is the fact that Iran never got invaded during all these years of severe tension. That, in itself, proves to me that there was no need for Iran to have a nuclear weapon to add to deterrents.

Actually, I would also say the opposite. Having a few nuclear devices paints a bull's eye on you. If you ever use them, you're submitting yourself to legitimate and very strong retaliation. It's just like Saddam Hussein, who could never use his chemical weapons because the United States told him unequivocally that if he used chemical weapons on us, we would retaliate.

So I think this is a complete canard about Iran needing or wanting a nuclear weapon program. Maybe in the foreseeable future I'll be proven wrong, but I don't think in the foreseeable future they'll develop one.

C. Austin Fitts: One of my theories is that the international community speaks of nuclear weapons when in fact what it is worried about is a kind of weapon different from a nuclear weapon, but since that weapon is not something in the public understanding, they just use the term "nuclear weapon."

In other words, they're afraid of technology other than nuclear weapons, but that technology is something invisible or the population doesn't understand it, or they don't want to bring it up because it's classified, so they just use "nuclear weapon" even though the term is a complete lie.

Saker: Are you thinking in terms of military technology, are you thinking in terms of economics here?



C. Austin Fitts: I tend to think that the big problem here is exactly what you said; they don't want Iran having energy independence through nuclear technology and being a developed country. without the G7 giving them permission to do so.

Saker: Exactly.

C. Austin Fitts: It's the economic model in its defiance, but it wouldn't surprise me if the Iranians have a kind of technology that is either weaponized or could be weaponized and which is other than nuclear weapons. Such weapons interest them because if Iranians can develop and have that technology, then they're really not under anybody's thumb. The problem is not that they're not anybody's thumb, but it means everybody else is going to get ideas.

Saker: I think that's what we see happening today, coming back to our issue of a multipolar world. What you're saying about Iran is already happening. I mean, they're having a host of what I would not call "minor" technologies, but they're not as visible technologies as nuclear weapons. They're excelling in atomic warfare, they're excelling in small ships coastal defense, and they're excelling in their air defense systems and missiles. But the same is true for China and the same is true for Russia. What's happening today is that countries are gradually developing sufficient protection to avoid being under anybody's thumb, and then they go for energy and economic independence.

So I agree with you completely. It's already happening. I don't think it's a secret technology or a type of weapon that any of those countries would have that's not spoken about. Iran is the perfect example. It's a big country, it's hard to invade, and it has enough technology to defend itself and give a very good defense.

You add the combination of that with politics, and it makes it basically unattackable.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: And, of course, China and Russia are completely unattackable because they have everything.



C. Austin Fitts: And China just built a train that goes all the way from China into Iran.

Saker: I was not aware of that. I knew they wanted to build one going from China to Europe.

C. Austin Fitts: Oh, it was about 30 days ago. It's up on our website. The first train went all the way from China into Iran, and if you look at how long it took for the train to go, it saved 31 days of transport time needed if a shipment goes by sea.

Saker: That's very much what is going to happen. There is, first of all, all the land routes east to west over the Eurasian land mass. Second of all, the Russians are very, very intently working on the sea routes going along the northern border of Russia – global warming helping with that. They're creating the infrastructure to create a major shipping lane going through the Arctic Sea. That's also going to cut time by a lot.

C. Austin Fitts: Right. So if you look at the build-out on the Silk Road, it's explosive in terms of wealth creation. It's amazing what's going to happen. That's why I think the China-Iran connection has always been one that's freaked out the United States.

I wanted to mention one thing. I just published a book review on David Talbot's book about Allen Dulles. It's called *The Devil's Chessboard*. It's fascinating because one of the things you realize is the Anglo-American Alliance spent World War I and World War II and made enormous sacrifices to amass a huge amount of global power. Then John F. Kennedy comes in and essentially decides he's going to switch everything to a multipolar world.

I realized, "Oh, that was the empire's last experiment with stopping a multipolar world from happening." Then you see from the time of the Kennedy assassination this real buildout of a unipolar world, and you take it global with the balancing of the global economy. Now you really have an exhaustion and an unraveling, like as if they tried to do a global empire and they didn't quite make it, and now it's unraveling back. Whereas Kennedy was trying to do it the nice way, now we're going to do it the rough way. Does that



make sense?

Saker: I never thought of Kennedy as trying to unravel the empire, to be honest. I would need to think about that. But what is certainly happening is that there is imperial overreach very evidently happening.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: In a collapse of power and authority and particularly unhealthy relationships, the fact that the United States had to beat down Europe into submission over policies that are clearly detrimental to Europe very much goes to show that is a sign of weakness and imperial overreach. It's not an alliance anymore. It's literally some colonial states that have to obey any order given to them.

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C. Austin Fitts: So let's turn to Europe. I was just reading the latest reports on what's happening in the United Kingdom. We have the British referendum on the continued role in the European Union in June, and clearly see Europe struggling with immigration. The question is: Will the European Union hold together?

Saker: You're asking for a prediction?

C. Austin Fitts: Yes.

Saker: Not in its current form, no. You know, a referendum can be hijacked. It has been done in the past. The other old trick that they use is--if they don't get the right answer to the referendum, they just keep doing referenda until they get the right answer.

C. Austin Fitts: They create another one.

Saker: I think what Europe needs is regime change. By "regime" I don't mean it negatively. I think the difference between a government and a regime is



that a regime is a system of government versus the actual people in power.

I think that the way it was designed, the US and the Bilderberger view of a united Europe as opposed to a Europe of fatherlands is dying right now. It's not sustainable, and it alienates more and more people in Europe.

I think there's going to be a major crisis in Europe, resulting from immigration certainly, economy certainly, and the black hole of the Ukraine will cost Europe a lot in political and economic terms.

C. Austin Fitts: How will that play out?

Saker: You have a country that is huge, which has 40 million people, that is essentially turning into Somalia right now, and somebody will have to pay. It is absolutely ridiculous to think that Russia can foot the bill for that. Russia is a big country, but it has a relatively small economy. Russia can barely help the Donbass economically. Russia does not have the means to resurrect and pump up normal conditions in the Ukraine. This country has been absolutely, thoroughly destroyed. There is still some inertia left, and then there's a lot of obfuscation happening, but the reality is that the Ukraine is finished as a country – completely. Economically it is gone. Socially I would say it is gone. Politically I would say it is gone.

What is left is territory and people who are armed and hungry, and everybody will have to pay for all of that. Russia will have to pitch in, but so will the United States, and so will Europe primarily. Russia will be able to keep its borders closed if need be; Russia has that ability. That's a crucial advantage that Russia has over Europe. Russia, if needed, can shut down her borders. Europe can't do that, and the Europeans will have to pay the most of that bill, which is only fair considering the role that they played in the destruction of the Ukraine. There is what I call *karmic* justice happening here, but that justice will be expensive.

You saw the attacks today on Brussels. That's scary stuff, and that's the future of Europe. It's going to get very, very ugly, and I think the political elites who are running Europe right now are incapable, incompetent, and unwilling to address it in any effective way. Right now there are no politicians who are



thinking of defending Europe, and that will have to change.

It's the same in the Ukraine, by the way. No elites in the Ukraine care about this country. So what will happen eventually and inevitably is that you will have to have a regime in power in Ukraine who actually for the first time cares about the Ukraine, and in Europe you'll have to have regimes who actually care about the European people.

Until that happens, the crisis is going to get worse and worse and worse and worse. I mean, I really am extremely pessimistic for the future of Europe.

C. Austin Fitts: In the European Union, do you think there's a chance it will pull back into the Northern European countries?

Saker: They can't do that on political grounds. That would be too late. The elites are so invested in the status quo. You have to understand that all the elites are hard-core Atlanticists; they're completely invested in that specific model of the development of Europe. They're completely invested in that crazy move to extend Central and Eastern Europe, and even some of them are discussing beyond. That political rhetoric, they're all invested 100% into it, and they cannot move elsewhere.

C. Austin Fitts: Part of it is now that they've organized into the euro, all of their financial systems are organized into it. If you are Switzerland or Norway or the United Kingdom, it is not as ugly a transition to break out. But if you're wholly dependent on the euro, it's a whole different ballgame.

Saker: Yes. So it's going to be very painful. It's a good idea, but totally manipulated and redirected. The welfare of the people of Europe was never part of that. So only new politicians and new generations that are not personally standing on the success of that project can do something. Right now they are nowhere near the power in Europe. They are nowhere near it.

C. Austin Fitts: Let's turn to the US presidential campaign because I'm kind of a person who doesn't scare very easily, but I really got scared in November that global investors would take a look at the United States and say, "This place is not under adult supervision," and it's done nothing but get crazier ever since.



I'm very curious as to what you think about the global response to the presidential campaign, and I'd also love to know what you think the global response will be to either one of the now leading nominees on the Democratic and Republican sides.

Saker: I have to confess to you that I only recently began paying attention to that because I don't believe at all in the current political US system. To me, it is the best democracy that money can buy and it is "\$1, one vote," and "not one person, one vote." So I view the election with utter cynicism. You change the puppets, but you keep the puppeteers.

For a while I started looking at Trump with interest just because of the hate campaign against him. I thought, "Maybe it's the Frankenstein or the Gollum." I think initially he was pushed by the deep states to make Hillary more palatable in comparison. For a while I thought maybe he was getting out of control, but I just listened this morning to his speech and I thought, "Okay, he's the same deal."

So I don't expect regime change in the US as a result of that election, which is the only thing that would really get me interested. But puppet change, we saw it with Obama. "Change you can believe in," and all the rest of his promises.

C. Austin Fitts: I didn't believe a word of it.

Saker: Neither did I. Actually on my blog I posted a speech from Malcolm X where he spoke about the house Negro and the field Negro. I asked the question, "Do you think Malcolm X would call Obama a house Negro or a field Negro?"

We got the answer, inasmuch as are most of the blacks around this administration-- They're all worse than the white people. You look at Susan Rice and all the rest of them, and they're just horrible.

To be honest, I have just one rooted fear of Hillary. I mean, she frightens me. I think she is incompetent and evil and deluded enough to actually think she can bully Russia into submission, and that is not going to happen. With her, I fear a war actually. I really do.



With the others, I don't know what to tell you. I don't see the election as providing relevant change. Maybe I'm mistaken. Maybe I'm wrong about Trump and maybe he can do something, but I can't possibly take him seriously.

C. Austin Fitts: I agree with you completely on that, although I do think whichever faction is running the machinery makes incremental minor differences.

Saker: On that I agree.

C. Austin Fitts: Here's my one fear. Let's talk about Clinton. Clinton came up in a unipolar world. From what I can tell, she's very similar to some of the people I worked with in the Bush administration. It's almost as if they cannot grasp complexity. Everything is conceptual, everything is abstract to them, they come up with a concept, and then they stamp it on.

So you go into Libya and you want the gold and the oil. You destroy everything, and then you have no plan. You take a country that's very advanced and developed, where people have a very nice life, and you basically destroy everything, and you have no plan as to how that is supposed to work.

You're just basically going around the world destroying things.

Saker: Yes, and I have to tell you that she is the one who recently declared that we never lost a single life in Libya after having a US ambassador lynched. I mean, you heard her remark about Gaddafi: "We came, we saw, he died."

As far as I know of her, her entire career is a mix of failures and taking liberties with the law of the land. I mean, she is really a scary lady. I think she's extraordinarily incompetent and just plain evil. She's clearly the one who the neocons favor. That's why I thought – because of her name and reputation and her negative ratings – that Trump served the function of the boogiemán who would make her more palatable.

I suppose if you really forced me to say who is the lesser evil, I suppose I would say Trump just because the neocons seem to be so in lockstep behind Clinton, but they don't depend on one administration. They're having an



influence in both. It's like when the Nazis had the SA and the SS, and I would agree that the SA were probably marginally better, but still they were Nazis.

C. Austin Fitts: There was a very funny article in the *New York Times* when Trump swept Super Tuesday. One of the lead neocons threw a hissy fit about why you could never tolerate Trump. He said, "He changes his position and he doesn't keep his deals."

The thought that the neocons would complain about that was hysterically funny. You don't like dealing with yourself? What's your problem?

Saker: It's a very, very sad and scary thing. This election makes me worried. It really does. It's just getting worse and worse.

C. Austin Fitts: Right. It is getting worse and worse, but I also think within the general population you're seeing more and more frustration. Leonard Cohen has a wonderful song that I love. The line says, "There's a crack in everything. That's how the light gets through."

The more the establishment and various parties fight – because remember they're not fighting over real policies. The real policies are run by the deep state. They're fighting over who will get the pork and incremental differences.

So as they do, you get all these cracks and you're getting leaks of information. The more it leaks, the more the general population is letting go of the official reality and starting to deal with reality.

Saker: Absolutely.

C. Austin Fitts: I see that as potentially very positive. One takeaway I would take from what I'm seeing is that I think the deep state has decided that about 40% of the establishment is now superfluous and can be reengineered out.

Saker: Yes.

C. Austin Fitts: So they're looking to downsize. That's number one. As they do, all those people are beginning to realize that they're about to be ejected.



What you're watching are people who have lived in the unipolar bubble who are very comfortable, and they're now contemplating the fact that they're no longer needed to put a pretty face to things.

Saker: Absolutely. And I also very much agree with this idea of cracks where light comes through. For instance, I see the big success of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Its biggest success was the concept of the one-percenter. I think it's huge that this finally came out in the open.

I think I see Sanders as a safety valve for the Occupy Wall Street movement just as Trump is an attempt to cater to the Tea Party, and Rand Paul was never elected President, but he achieved a lot of visibility by just raising the topics that were not part of the fiscal discourse. So the deep state is failing in its ideological control over the United States, and there definitely is frustration.

It's a personal anecdote, but I think most people hate both parties.

C. Austin Fitts: Oh, they do.

Saker: There is a sense of alienation, and that is exactly what was observed. Most Russians who lived through it will tell you that the United States today looks very much like the Brezhnev and the last years of the Soviet Union in the 1980's. There's a similarity there. People don't have the ability to change the regime, but they're disgusted and see it openly. They make jokes about it and officially show disrespect and disgust for the regime. I see that all over the place here.

C. Austin Fitts: I think the United States has a problem that it is neither feared nor respected. We've gone from a world where the United States was respected and feared to one where it is not respected and not feared.

Saker: That is absolutely true.

C. Austin Fitts: Part of the problem is if you have to make a switch from the unipolar to a multipolar world, and you have to do it, then you need leadership who can do it. But in what we're holding up and running around and promoting in this Presidential election, we're seeing people who can't do it.



Saker: Absolutely true.

C. Austin Fitts: The unipolar team is fighting over who gets to be bad at multipolar. That's what it looks like to me.

Saker: That's true. And the pork? Who gets the money?

C. Austin Fitts: So one other thing I wanted to bring up is that I just wrote a commentary on *The Kingsman Campaign*. Have you seen the movie *The Kingsman* yet?

Saker: No, I haven't.

C. Austin Fitts: I recommend it to you highly even though it is a dreadful movie. I think it's number six or number seven on Netflix. In the movie there's a Silicon Valley billionaire called Richmond Valentine who is played by Samuel Jackson. He has given out free SIM cards that connect people to his cell network. He's fielded a global array of satellites, and he's built a machinery that can – according to the tones – basically influence or control their behavior, including making them jump up and kill each other. So it soon turns very violent.

Anyway, I did a survey of the campaign as Trump and Clinton were both emerging, and I went to 20 people whose advice I go to and who I really value. I said, "What percentage of support for the two candidates is coming from Richmond Valentine? How much of it is coming from the entrainment, the media, the subliminal programming, and all the different techniques you have to pump this?"

They said 75-80%. So when people say to me, "What's going to happen to Trump?" I say, "What does Richmond Valentine want to have happen to Trump? That's what is going to happen to Trump."

I thought Trump was going to white out all the other Republican contenders so that Bush could take the Republican nomination. Now I think you're

The unipolar team is fighting over who gets to be bad at multipolar.



probably right; he's there to white out the Republicans for Clinton.

I think the question ultimately is: What does Richmond Valentine want?

Saker: There is always the possibility – which I would not discount completely – of the creature getting out of control.

C. Austin Fitts: Right.

Saker: That has happened in the past. In theory a man with enough wealth could surprise himself by entering that race just for some backroom deal with the deep state. Then he says, "I'm electable." Maybe he'll begin believing himself. Maybe if he gets to power he will suddenly do things which were not expected.

I'm not holding my breath, but I don't completely discount the possibility. There is a small chance of that still happening. That's my very, very minimal hope.

C. Austin Fitts: Here's the thing. It seems to me that America's plan to go into a multipolar world is to kind of crash into it. You just wonder how ugly it's going to be.

Saker: I think they're not accepting it yet. I don't think the American leaders have made their peace. I don't think there is a plan to go to a multipolar world. The elites are resisting it. America is essentially at war with Russia. That's what is happening. The United States is at war with Russia. Make no mistake about it. Its 80% information, 15% economy, and 5% military in the Ukraine and Syria.

All these are clear signs that the United States is not accepting multipolarity yet; it is fighting.

C. Austin Fitts: So tell us what happens next between the United States and Russia. Where does this go over the next year?

Saker: That is an extremely hard thing to answer. It depends if we assume a



rational actor on the part of the United States or not. So far, when it got to the brink, the US has been rational as the example with Iran showed.

My hope is they are part of the deep state, and I have to thank the military and intelligence community who are sufficiently patriotic to avoid getting the planet into a nuclear war. I mean, I want to believe in that. Not the politicians – they're too stupid and arrogant.

But if that is still the case, if there are enough non-neocons, American patriots who understand that this is the next strategic objective of this country is to make a soft landing, as soft as can be. It's going to be a rough landing anyway. No empire has gently landed into a state of normalcy and become a normal country, but I think this is the big hope. There is a way to achieve as soft of a landing as possible. If that is going to happen, then we're going to see more of the same, which is basically a gradual erosion of US power and influence, and the United States having to accept that it has to have limited international objectives and negotiations.

The good side is that as long as we see that happening, we're basically on a dangerous but possibly viable track. If we see, for instance, a Hillary presidency and the resurgence of that insane anti-Russian rhetoric and attempts to restart the war in Europe, then all bets are off. I'm afraid that's the neocon plan – to have a war in Europe as their way to save their idea of what the United States (what I call the Anglo-Zionist Empire) is supposed to be.

C. Austin Fitts: And what does that war look like? Is it a land war or a nuclear war?

Saker: Well, again, I think Russia would prevail even in conventional terms because NATO is a military farce right now. So I think it would remain a mostly political and conventional war. But if the United States got involved seriously, Russian doctrine says that if the survival of Russia as a state is threatened, there is the right to use nuclear weapons first. Of course, if the nuclear weapons are used against Russia, that's another situation where Russia would retaliate. So there would be a severe risk of nuclear war. Militarily speaking, using nukes in Europe makes no sense. I mean, it is just crazy.



Again, if we assume rational actors on the US side, it is not going to happen. I would say that the Russians are ready for war but they fear war. They will do everything they can to avoid a nuclear war with the United States while participating in the evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar world, and that is the overriding and number one objective of Putin. The big risk is like a bomb that you have to diffuse. You have to make it happen in such a way that does not force the United States or corner it into a nuclear war with Russia and China, or just with China.

C. Austin Fitts: It is interesting to watch the developments. The challenge that Europe has is its being locked right now into the euro. The challenge to the United States is its dependence on the dollar. So, if you are Mr. Global running this thing, the question remains the dollar: the dollar market share has been coming down, down, down, down. So it is a matter of building up all the other arrangements, which takes time. That is what you have got to do.

We see the European central banks now working on their own version of bitcoin. So I think what you are going to see is massive efforts at building out the currencies and the payment system so that whatever the transition is, it doesn't hiccup and pull the whole world into nuclear war. That is what's going to force nuclear war – when they cannot make the cash flows work and somebody gets cornered by the cash flows.

Saker: Yes, if they have nothing else to lose. Absolutely.

C. Austin Fitts: So you've been very generous with your time. I want you to again describe your fabulous website and how we participate in The Saker of the Vineyard world.

Saker: You can go to the website at www.TheSaker.is. We put up updates and guest articles. All the information there is available. You can also get my newest book, *The Essential Saker*. You can find it there on my website.

C. Austin Fitts: I just have to mention that I have finished your book, and it is absolutely fantastic. I told you that I printed out the whole thing before I realized how long it was. So I had the paper sitting in my den, and every time I would stop and take a break or have dinner, I would just grab 20 or 30 pages



and read. Finally the day came when I walked out for dinner. I'd finished it at lunch, and I realized that I couldn't get my Saker fix.

So you have to write another one.

Saker: I'll give you the exclusive information. I am working on a joint book with another author.

C. Austin Fitts: Fabulous!

Saker: It's on an interesting topic, but I won't say anything any further than that on the author or the topic, but I promise you that the other author is a very interesting man.

C. Austin Fitts: But your current one everyone can buy by going to your website.

Saker: Or they can go to Amazon. It's called *The Essential Saker*.

C. Austin Fitts: Here's the thing that I want to tell everyone. It weaves between the geopolitics and some of the military issues with culture. You go from the macro to the micro, and there are parts where you just feel free to let your feelings flow in reaction to something.

I'm thinking particularly of some of the French politics that had me lying on the den floor laughing and pounding the floor. They were so funny!

You literally laugh until you cry because we're dealing with a very inhuman force that is coming, and you've found a way to rant about the inhumanity of it. A lot of the ranting just gets me exhausted, but you have a way of ranting about it which is really uplifting and rejuvenating.

I can't recommend it enough. I would just tell people to be warned before you print it out; it's very long. You're getting lots for your money.

Saker: Thank you.



C. Austin Fitts: Anyway, we can also donate at your site, correct?

Saker: Yes. Absolutely. There's a donation box there to support our work.

C. Austin Fitts: Well, The Solari Report is here to support you. Saker, we can't thank you enough for your work. You make sense of it all. Whenever I go to your website, what happens is I find myself looking at something in the *Wall Street Journal* and I'm shaking my head, saying, "What is going on? I know! I'll go see what Saker has to say about this."

Saker: Thank you very much. That's very kind of you to say.

C. Austin Fitts: Before we close, do you have anything you want to add? What should we be looking for until we get to talk to you again in three months?

Saker: A possible resumption of hostilities in the Ukraine unfortunately. That is a very real risk because the infighting has started among the elites there. The country is completely ungovernable. It's actually breaking apart.

The regional powers are becoming more important than even the central authority. So there is a very real risk of resumption of combat operations against the Donbass in the next couple of months. Sorry about that pessimistic forecast.

C. Austin Fitts: It is what it is. Saker, you have a wonderful quarter, and we'll talk to you in three months.

Saker: Thank you so much. Greetings to everybody, and thank you.

C. Austin Fitts: Thank you.



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